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THE LAW'S ILLEGITIMATE CHILD?
I.
THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Kings County, New
York' has brought into the open a highly controversial and legally
obscure area of activity. Artificial insemination (AI), a somewhat
ancient method of breeding,2 has reappeared on the modern scene bring-
ing with it confusion and indecision. This method of conception was
first attempted on a human being in the year 1799 by the English phy-
sician Dr. John Hunter,8 and the practice spread to the United States
in 1866 when Dr. J. Marion Sims of North Carolina conducted a
series of fifty-five inseminations with varying degrees of success.
4
There are two methods of artificial insemination: Artificial In-
semination Husband (A.I.H.) and Artificial Insemination Donor
(A.I.D.). The former, utilized by Doctors Hunter and Sims, involves
the use of the husband's semen while in the latter the semen of a third
party donor is used.
AI gained acceptance and popularity in Central and Western
Europe sometime between 1890 and 1910.' By 1941, in the United
States alone, Al resulted in ten thousand successful pregnancies.' At
the present time responsible estimates indicate more than triple this
amount' at the rate of one thousand to twelve hundred births per year,'
although higher estimates are offered. A.I.H. is of small legal signifi-
cance.'" While no definitive surveys are available, it is estimated that
1. Gursky v. Gursky, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1963, p. 6, col. 4.
2. Artificial insemination was first used successfully by the Arabs on mares as
early as 1322. Rutherford & Banks, Semination Techniques and Results, 5 FERTILITY &
STZRILrTY 271 (1954).
3. GLOVER, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AMONG HUMAN BEINGS 4-5 (1948).
4. Ibid.
5. VAN DE VELDE, FERTILITY & STERILITY IN MARRIAGE (Brown transl. 1951).
6. Seymour & Koerner, Artificial Insemination, 116 A.M.A.J. 2747 (1941).
7. Weinberger, A Partial Solution to Legitimacy Problems Arising from the Use
of Artificial Insemination, 35 IND. L.J. 143 (1960).
8. Lang, Artificial Insemination-Legitimacy or Illegitimacy, McCalls, May,
1955, p. 60.
9. One author places the number at five to seven thousand or more. Guttmacher,
Artificial Insemination, 97 ANN. NEw YORK ACAD. SCIENCEs 623 (1962).
10. Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S. 14981, Super. Ct., Cook County, Il1. (1954).
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from 1/3 to 2/ of AI attempts are performed with the sperm of a
donor." It is this potential majority of A.I.D. inseminations that
underscores the importance of the legal considerations. The legal and
social problems of A.I.D. are many and unresolved. A court of final
jurisdiction has yet to be confronted with the subject, and legislatures
have thus far ignored it. A.I.D. raises basic problems of adultery and
illegitimacy, and no two courts in the same jurisdiction have resolved
the questions consistently.
The earliest case on record dealing with A.I.D. is Orford v.
Orford,12 decided in Canada. In this case a woman sued for support,
and her husband defended on the ground that his wife was an adulteress.
The wife then claimed that the child was conceived by A.I.D. during a
period of separation from her husband. The court held that the wife
had committed adultery by having sexual intercourse in the natural
manner, and that A.I.D. had not taken place. Justice Orde went on to
say by way of dictum that A.I.D. would constitute adultery where the
husband's consent had not been obtained. In 1924, three years later, an
English court maintained that consent was immaterial and that A.I.D.
was unquestionably an adulterous act. 3 This English case involved a
suit for divorce. As in Orford4 the wife conceived during a period of
non-access and claimed the birth resulted from A.I.D. The husband
was granted the divorce, the court holding that the wife had committed
natural adultery. Here it was Lord Dunedin who deviated from the
issue and declared A.I.D. an adulterous act. The English and Canadian
cases have similar factual situations, and the reason for the discrepancy
in the dicta on the issue of consent is not apparent.
The United States tribunals have proffered a few solutions of their
own to the problems raised by A.I.D. The first case in this country,
Hoch v. Hoch,' was brought before the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois. Again the husband was suing for divorce on the grounds of
adultery. The wife defended averring that she had submitted to A.I.D.
The court granted the divorce on the grounds of natural adultery. This
court also digressed and stated that A.I.D. without the consent of the
husband would not be adultery. There is no attempt to reconcile this
view with the dictum in the Orford case, and the reasons for the
contradiction were not discussed.
Six years later the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois was
confronted with an identical situation in Doornbos v. Doornbos."6 This
time the issue of A.I.D. directly confronted the court. A husband
11. Weinberger, supra note 7.
12. 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
13. Russell v. Russell, [1924] A.C. 687. The English courts have more recently
held that sexual intimacies short of sexual intercourse amounted to adultery. See
Sapsford v. Sapsford, [1954] 2 All E.R. 373 (Hampshire Assizes).
14. 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
15. Unreported, Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1948); see Chicago Sun, Feb. 10,
1945, p. 13, col. 3; Time, Feb. 26, 1945, p. 58.
16. Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S. 14981, Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1954).
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sought a divorce on the grounds of adultery. The wife had submitted
to A.I.D. with the express consent of her husband, yet the court held
that the wife had committed adultery, and the child born thereby was
illegitimate. The divorce was granted. This decision directly over-
ruled the dicta expounded in the Hoch case yet the facts are indistin-
guishable.
The conflict regarding A.I.D. is not confined to England, Canada
and the United States. Italy and Scotland have also added to existing
confusion. A Roman civil court held A.I.D. constituted adultery in
195617 while the High Court of Sessions in Scotland declared just the
opposite in 1958. i8 The Scottish Court, in defense of their position,
pointed out that Lord Dunedin's view in Russell v. Russell was dictum.
In addition to adultery, courts are plagued by the problem of what
legal status to apply to children resulting from A.I.D. Generally those
courts holding A.I.D. to be adulterous also deem the children produced
to be illegitimate and vice versa." New York entered the melee in 1948
with the Strnad v. Strnad decision."0 The contest here centered around
a husband's visitation rights to a child born to his wife as a result of
A.I.D. The court held that the written consent of the husband to the
insemination constituted a quasi-adoption or semi-adoption giving him
the right to visit the child. The court, by way of dictum, determined
that the legal status of the child was the same as that of a child born
out of wedlock who by law is made legitimate by the subsequent mar-
riage of its parents.2 In keeping with the procedure set forth by the
Illinois courts in Hoch22 and Doornbos,23 however, the Supreme Court
of Kings County, New York departed from the Strnad position in
August of 1963 in the case of Gursky v. Gursky.24 Here an action was
brought by a husband for annulment and separation. When the annul-
ment was denied for failure to prove that consummation never took
place the wife amended her answer to include a counterclaim for annul-
ment which was granted. During the marriage a child was born to the
wife through A.I.D. with the written consent of the husband who also
assumed all responsibility for costs and medical bills. Justice Con-
stantino dismissed Strnad as dictum and followed strict common law
principles regarding children born outside of the marriage. Since the
father of the child was not the husband of the mother the child was
illegitimate. 25 Here the court alluded to the Doornbos decision in
support of its verdict. However, Judge Constantino decided that the
17. Hahlo, Some Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 74 S.A.L.J. 167 (1957).
18. MacLennan v. MacLennan, [1958] Sess. Cas. 105 (Scot.).
19. See, Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S. 14981, Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill.(1954) ; Russell v. Russell, [19241 A.C. 687.
20. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
21. Id., 78 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
22. Unreported, Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1948).
23. No. 54 S. 14981, Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1954).
24. N.Y.L.J. Aug. 5, 1963, p. 6, col. 4.
25. Id. at col. 6.
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consent of the husband to A.I.D. amounted to a semi-adoption and
held him liable for the support of the child. At least on the adoption
theory, the New York cases concur. To support its adoption theory, the
court used equitable estoppel; the written consent of the husband
induced the wife to change her position to her detriment by taking on
a financial burden that should be borne by the husband.2"
What will happen to these cases if and when they reach an appel-
late court is left to conjecture, but it has been suggested that the view
that the child is illegitimate taken in the Gursky and Doornbos cases
will not be upheld.2 7 To understand the possible impact of A.I.D.,
factors must be considered other than the lack of judicial consistency
and the sharp increase in births since 1941. One out of every ten
couples married today will be unable to have children." There are
currently eleven families waiting for every child available for adoption. 29
As high as forty per cent of sterility in marriage is attributable to the
husband. 0 The legal world, now in a boundless quandary, is left to
digest all the foregoing considerations and arrive at a satisfactory
solution. There are possible alternatives: do nothing and maintain the
status quo, outlaw A.I.D. completely, or control A.I.D. by statutory
regulation.
To remain passive would only allow a confused situation to con-
tinue and possibly worsen. If each jurisdiction is left free to solve the
problems created by A.I.D. for itself on a case by case basis, the present
trend of reversal, conflict and dictum is likely to continue. For ex-
ample, although adultery is now generally governed by legislation, the
interpretation of the legislation is left largely to the courts, thus creating
diverse views as to what actually constituted adultery.31 Today the laws
of the different states uniformly agree as to when a child is illegitimate,
but still differ widely as to the rights and status of such a child.82 With
the current practice of A.I.D. widespread and increasing, a passive
approach is in all respects undesirable.
On the other hand, affirmative action in the form of legislative
prohibition of A.I.D. could eliminate the problem completely. This
would resolve all doubt and conflict-in theory at least. Such a pro-
hibition would have to be based on the states' police power, that is,
the power vested in the legislature to establish reasonable laws, regu-
lations and statutes for the good of the commonwealth and the welfare
26. Ibid.
27. Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Considerations for Effective
Counseling, 39 N.C.L. Rev. 230, 233-34 (1961).
28. Warner, Problems and Treatment of the Infertile Couple, 57 MZDICAL
WOMAN'S JOURNAL 13 (1950).
29. Pommerenke, Artificial Insemination: Genetic and Legal Implications, 9 OBST.
& GYNxC. 189 (1957).
30. Ibid.
31. Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1876) ; Richey v. State, 172 nd. 134, 87 N.E.
1032 (1909) ; Territory v. Whitcomb, 1 Mont. 359 (1871).
32. E.g., Lund v. Lund, 26 Cal.2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945) ; Mund v. Rehaume,
51 Colo. 129, 117 Pac. 159 (1911).
[VOL. 9
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of its people. 33 The police power can be exercised to establish rules of
good manners and good neighborhoods 4 by regulating the individual
for the good of the common welfare.3 5 This power unquestionably,
extends to legislation in the areas of health, preservation of good order
and public morals. 6 The exercise of the police power must be reason-
able under the circumstances presented, cannot unreasonably limit the
rights of individuals, and must be reasonably designed to accomplish
its purpose.8 1
A problem arises in drafting a statute outlawing A.I.D. within
the above definition of the proper function of the police power. There
is no evidence that A.I.D. has adverse effects on the mental or physical
health of the parties involved. To warrant legislation in the area there
must be some evil existing affecting the public health and welfare.3"
Public morals legislation 9 must show a reasonable connection
between the regulation and the activity affecting public morality.4 The
strongest argument to be advanced in favor of regulation is that A.I.D.
constitutes adultery and as such is deleterious to the morals of the gen-
eral public. There can be no question that the reasonable exercise of
the states' police power extends to outlawing adulterous activity.41
However, legal authority declaring A.I.D. adulterous is meager and
insubstantial, 42 and furthermore, the common law required sexual inter-
course as a requisite for adultery. Although state courts have to some
extent liberalized their definitions of adultery, actual penetration is still
required. 4
A further complication raised by any statute seeking to outlaw
A.I.D. is the possibility that child-bearing is a liberty or right pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This contention has never been
formally asserted, but could certainly be advanced to attack the statute
as an unreasonable exercise of the police power. The United States
Supreme Court in deciding Poe v. Ullman 45 was faced with a situation
33. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 16 S.Ct. 43 (1895).
34. Territory v. O'Connor, 5 Dak. 397, 41 N.W. 746 (1889).
35. People v. Dehn, 190 Mich. 122, 155 N.W. 744 (1916).
36. Walton v. Atlanta, 89 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
37. Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
38. First Nat'l Beneficial Soc'y v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972 (S.D. Cal. 1945);
Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942); Parish Council v.
Louisiana Highway & Heavy Branch of Associated Gen. Contractors, 131 So. 2d 272(La. 1961) ; State Board of Health v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 82 Vt. 276, 73 Atl.
581 (1909).
39. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240 (1915).
40. State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940) ; Eccles v. Stone, 134 Fla.
113, 183 So. 628 (1938) ; Parkes v. Bartlett, 236 Mich. 460, 210 N.W. 492 (1926).
41. Crane v. People, 168 111. 395, 48 N.E. 54 (1897).
42. See text accompanying notes 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 18, supra.
43. Warner v. State, 202 Ind. 479, 175 N.E. 661 (1931).
44. People v. Salmon, 148 Cal. 303, 83 Pac. 42 (1905); Bashford v. Wells, 78
Kan. 295, 96 Pac. 663 (1908) ; Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d
704 (1943) ; McCullough v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 258, 296 S.W. 530 (1927) ; Ermis
v. Ermis, 255 Wis. 339, 38 N.W.2d 485 (1949). But see, Sapsford v. Sapsford, [1954]
2 All E.R. 373 (Hampshire Assizes). Therefore, it is possible for a wife to have a
bastard child yet not commit adultery.
45. 367 U.S. 497, 81 S.Ct. 1752 (1961).
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not far removed from the A.I.D. controversy. The appellants were a
woman, her husband and their physician. The woman had given birth
to several children, all of whom were abnormal and died shortly after
birth. The physical and psychological strain on the husband and wife
were extreme and appellant Dr. Buxton suggested that the safest course
of action for the couple would be treatment and medical advice as to
methods of preventing conception. However, this was impossible be-
cause of a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives for any
reason. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling in a Connecticut
court that the law was unconstitutional in that it deprived them of life
and liberty without due process of law. The case was dismissed upon
demurrer on the grounds that the State Supreme Court had already
decided the question against the plaintiffs' position. The appellants
came to the Supreme Court on a writ of error. The case was dis-
missed by the High Court for lack of a justiciable controversy. How-
ever, the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan,46 Mr. Justice
Douglas4 7 and Mr. Justice Stewart" strongly argued that the use of
contraceptives in marriage was a constitutionally protected right, the
deprivation of which would result in a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. If these dissents can be taken as an indication of reluctance
on the part of some members of the Supreme Court to judicially inter-
fere in the reproductive process, any statute outlawing A.I.D. may run
the risk of violating the Constitution.
It must be remembered that we are dealing in an area largely
concerned with the rights and position of children. There is a strong
presumption of legitimacy where a child is born to parents who are
lawfully married,4" and courts are not wont to endow a child with the
legal and social stigma accompanying illegitimacy. 50 In addition we
are involved in a highly personal area of psychological and emotional
import. The experience of child-bearing should be denied only with
extreme caution.5 '
In view of the foregoing considerations, a proposed statute totally
outlawing A.I.D. would have little chance of ever becoming law,
although from the standpoint of some religions, outlawing A.I.D. would
be the only satisfactory solution. The Catholic Church spoke out
against artificial insemination as early as 1897.52 The view is adamant
and unequivocal in denouncing any form of AI for whatever reason.
The Catholic position was renewed with even greater vigor in 1949
when Pope Pius XII, addressing the Fourth International Congress of
Catholic Doctors in Rome, declared such practices to be immoral and
46. Id. at 522, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1766.
47. Id. at 509, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1759.
48. Id. at 555, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1783.
49. MADDEN, THt LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RLUATIONs 338-39 (1931).
50. Ibid. Hale v. State, 217 Ala. 403, 116 So. 369 (1928).
51. Puxon, Without Father Bred, 102 SOL. J. 95 (1958).
52. Rice, A.I.D.-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510 (1959).
[VOL. 9
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worthy of outright condemnation.5 3 This strong resentment is likewise
shared by the Church of England. The Archbishop of Canterbury has
declared Al contrary to Christian principles.54
If we should not remain passive to the existence of A.I.D. and
cannot remove it, we must try to regulate it keeping in mind its im-
miense problems and consequences. It is necessary, therefore, that any
regulation introduced must be detailed and comprehensive, covering
each phase of the process from the donation of the sperm to the birth
of the child. The act must regulate not only donors, physicians, mothers
and husbands, but also any institution or company distributing, storing,
or receiving seminal fluid. An act failing to provide safeguards in any
of these areas would be wholly defective.
To illustrate the problems to be encountered and the detail nec-
essary for their solutions a Model Artificial Insemination Statute has




Article I of the act gives all the names and terms used in the act
their every day meaning and usage. This article prevents definitional
controversies regarding dual meanings of words and titles relating to
persons as used in the act.
B. Filing Requirements
1. Applications
Article II, Section 2 of the act requires the donor to apply to a
Public Board of Artificial Insemination before donating sperm. Article
IV, Section 1 also requires the application of the prospective mother.
These sections of the act are for the purposes of maintaining records of
donations and inseminations in order to identify the parties in case any
liability established by the act should arise, to enable the authorities
enforcing the act to acquire knowledge of possible inseminations, and
to be sure that each procedural requirement under the act for a lawful
insemination is performed.
Articles II, III and IV each have provisions (sections 4, 1 and 1
respectively) for the filing of consent by the spouses of the donor, if
married, and the mother. These sections must be complied with before
any party is eligible for either donation or insemination. Under these
53. Ibid.
54. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1949, p. 13, col. 2.
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provisions the problems presented in the Orford,55 Hoch56 and Russell"
cases dealing with the consent of the husband are removed. Here the
husband's knowledge of his wife's activity is evidenced in writing and
responsibility for the child is imposed. Article II resolves any question
regarding the donor relative to a possible claim of infidelity by his wife
resulting from the donation of sperm.
2. Physical Examinations
Article II, Section 3 and Article IV, Section 2 require the donor
and mother to undergo a physical examination for the purpose of dis-
covering any venereal disease that could affect the health of the mother
or child. Similar requirements are found in most statutes dealing with
marriage licenses.5 In addition, any other physical infirmity or nervous
disorder that could possibly be transmitted to a child during pregnancy
would be discovered. These sections also require mental examinations
since there is little doubt that certain mental defects are inheritable.59
The results of these examinations must be filed along with the consents
and applications of the parties, though not in any specific order.
3. Place of Filing
Article VIII, Section 1 provides for the establishment of a Public
Board of Artificial Insemination under the auspices of the State Bureau
of Health and Welfare for the purposes of compiling records, filing all
appropriate data and issuing proofs of eligibility allowing the parties
to donate or receive spermatozoa in the artificial insemination process.
If effective regulation is to be maintained, there must be a public agency
in charge of its enforcement. The Board of Artificial Insemination is
to be comprised of a physician, a psychiatrist and a lawyer. The phy-
sician and psychiatrist are provided to determine the physical and
mental health of the donor, mother and child, while the lawyer is avail-
able to enforce the procedural requirements and sanctions provided for
in the act. This Board would function in much the same manner as
any governmental agency, with its own tribunals to hear grievances and
provide remedies under the act. The Board's decisions are final without
the right of appeal to the courts of law.
55. 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
56. Unreported, Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1948).
57. [1924] A.C. 687.
58. CAL. Civ. CODE § 79.01; COLO. Riv. STAr. § 90-1-4 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT.
Ch. 89 §§ 6-6A (Smith-Hurd 1956); N.Y. DoM. REL. 13A; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48§§ 1-4 (1936); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.10 (1957).
59. MoTTRAM, THE PHYSICAL BASIS OV PERSONALITY (1944); HARRIS, HUMAN
BIOCHEMICAL GENETICS (1959); GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILY (1927).
[VOL. 9
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C. Proof of Eligibility
Sections 2 and 5 of Article VIII deal with the procedure for issuing
proof of eligibility for participation as donor or recipient. This is to
make certain that all provisions of the act have been followed. In this
way the health of the parties is protected, the liability of the parties is
set, and the status of the child is established. There would be little sense
in requiring applications, consents or examinations unless proof of
eligibility or some similar device need be shown in order for persons
to qualify for artificial insemination. Licensing statutes are perfect ex-
amples of such regulatory methods. Article V, Section 2 requiring any
physician to examine the proof of eligibility before he may extract or
administer the sperm is an example of the function of these proofs in
relation to the enforcement of the act.
D. The Child
To eliminate the legitimacy problems brought to light in the
Gursky,0 Strnad6' and Doornbos2 decisions, the act contains certain
limitations and imposes certain duties on the parties which, if performed,
will not only qualify the mother for insemination, but will also render
the child so conceived legitimate. Article VI deals directly with the
child. Section 1 renders the child born in conformity with the act
legitimate to the mother and her husband and makes him the lawful
heir of both. To erase any doubt regarding the status of the child,
Section 2 of Article VI delineates the circumstances under which the
child will be illegitimate. Only when the consent of the husband is not
forthcoming or where the mother violates the section dealing with the
selection of the sperm will the child be declared illegitimate. Since the
main purpose of the act is to establish the position and status of the
child, both sections of this article are vital.
E. The Physician
Article V, Section 1 imposes and defines the duties of the physician
extracting or administering sperm. The duty is the ordinary standard
of care required by the profession of medical practitioners practicing
in the area where A.I.D. is performed. To impose a greater duty
would be overly burdensome for this is not an area requiring special
training or knowledge beyond that of the ordinary practitioner. As
has been pointed out in sub-section C, Section 2 of this article requires
that proof of eligibility be shown before any of the processes of artificial
insemination may be performed.
60. N.Y.L.J. Aug. 5, 1963, p. 6, col. 4.
61. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
62. No. 54 S. 14981, Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1954).
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F. Spermatozoa
Perhaps all sections of the act would be entirely useless if provi-
sions are not made for the classification, identification, care, handling
and selection of the sperm to be used in the insemination process.
Article VII is designed for the express purpose of closing any possible
loopholes left by other articles of the statute. Section 1 of this article
provides, "Any institution whether publicly or privately owned or
operated, housing, storing or distributing sperm for the purposes of
artificial insemination shall mark each container with the name, address,
age and physical characteristics of the donor including race, color and
educational background." The purpose of this section is to separate,
segregate and classify the sperm according to the above characteristics
for the purpose of permitting the couple submitting to artificial insem-
ination to select the qualities their child will acquire. It is important
to note that an attack of this act as an unreasonable exercise of the
police power will no doubt center around this section. Under the
equal protection clause of the Constitution classification according to
physical characteristics has been upheld, even though discriminatory
in respect to certain qualities of individuals, where a proper relationship
between the discrimination and the purpose of classification was
achieved. 3 The purpose served by classification in the model statute
is merely for the purpose of identification, and nowhere in the act is
the couple selecting the sperm required to select or limited to the selec-
tion of sperm of a specific class or color. The equal protection clause
was not meant to limit6 4 or affect65 the proper exercise of the police
power.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits
classification so long as it is not arbitrary and capricious 6 and if the
classification is permitted by the equal protection clause, it is equally
permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Certainly no one can deny
that color of eyes, hair and skin or even the shape of a nose or ear are
inherited from the parent. Also it has been shown that mental char-
acteristics, including degree of intelligence, are largely inherited.6
In view of these inheritable qualities, a classification such as that pro-
vided by the act is necessary and valid. Because of the importance of
the selection of the sperm to the physical and mental makeup of the
child, Article IV Section 5 requires that the mother and her husband
select the sperm together, and Article VI Section 2 renders the child
illegitimate should this section be violated. Article IX Section 5 makes
such a violation a marital offense sufficient to form the grounds for a
63. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324 (1908).
64. Supra note 50.
65. Hartford Steam Boiler Insp. & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 57 S.Ct.
38 (1937).
66. Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S.W. 955 (1899).
67. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,5 S.Ct. 357 (1884).
68. Supra note 59.
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civil divorce. This last section eliminates solving the adultery problem
encountered in Doornbos. In effect it adopts the court's view that in
A.I.D. where consent of the husband to the insemination or selection
of the sperm is lacking, the wife is adulterous and the child, illegitimate.
G. Sanctions
In any statute regulating human conduct there must be provisions
for discouraging would-be violators. Article IX was drafted for this
purpose and to provide monetary relief to those wronged by violation
of the act. These sections impose liability for negligent and deliberate
violations. Sanctions include fine, incarceration, and provisions for
divorce. It may be desirable to impose greater sanctions for violations
of the act; however, the sanctions provided represent the minimum
required to insure compliance with the statute.
H. Miscellaneous Provisions
Article VIII, Section 5 provides that :proof of eligibility shall be
valid for only a period of six months. This time limit serves a two-fold
purpose: it will prevent a donor from making donations many months
after he qualifies for eligibility thereby protecting against any physical
or mental disability acquired over six months after qualification; the
time limit will prevent fraud against a husband who retracts his consent
to further AI treatments after the birth of:a child.
Article VII, Sections 2 and 3 impose certain liabilities upon com-
panies and institutions handling and distributing sperm to be used in
artificial insemination. This Will insure to some extent the quality of
the sperm from the time of donation to its injection.
Article IV, Section 4 requires a waiting period of thirty days
from the time of filing all necessary statements and other data before
the husband and his wife may be qualified to receive the insemination.
Since all the filing required of the prospective parents can be done in a
matter of minutes it is conceivable that such application can be made
without due thought. A certain period of time should be provided to
allow thorough consideration of a step so serious as that of permitting
a new strain of blood to enter the family.69
III.
CONCLUSION
As a practical matter would an Artificial Insemination Statute of
the nature presented ever be enacted? One can readily see that shades
of George Orwell's 198470 permeate each section. With each legislative
69. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 §§ 1-4 (1936)..
70. ORWtLL, 1984 (Signet ed. 1952).
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limitation we come closer and closer to the governmentally supervised
society so grotesquely described by Orwell. We are classifying, con-
trolling and licensing birth. We shall only use the sperm of the strong
and deposit it only within the womb of the strong.71 Yet our argu-
ments support greater detail and more expansive control in our regula-
tion rather than less, although the medical profession may take an
opposite view.7 2 Failure to regulate effectively each phase of the process
is failure to effectively regulate the whole. The outgrowth of such a
law could wreak havoc on the very society we are trying to protect.
State control could eventually extend to every phase of human activity.
If we can determine who will give birth and by what method, why not
decide who may think or speak. Indeed, the same arguments used to
defeat a statute outlawing AID. can be used to defeat this encompass-
ing piece of regulatory legislation. This conclusion may not be the
most desirable, but it is legally inescapable. We can not completely
71. HOLMES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 306 (1921): "I
believe that the wholesale social regeneration which so many now seem to expect, if it
can be helped by conscious, coordinated human effort, cannot be affected appreciably by
tinkering with the institution of property, but only by taking in hand life and trying
to build a race."
72. See Guttmacher, Artificial Insemination, 97 ANN. Ntw YORK ACAD. SCINCES
623 (1962). Dr. Guttmacher in this article expresses a medical viewpoint that would
disagree with the purposes and provisions of the Model Artificial Insemination Statute
appearing in the text. Dr. Guttmacher thinks that in practicing A.I.D. six rules
should be followed. The first is complete anonymity regarding the donor and the
recipient of his sperm. This factor, according to Dr. Guttmacher, is absolutely
essential. Second, the physician should know the couple considerating the insemina-
tion. It is important to know the physical and emotional stability of the couple as
well as the quality of the marriage, since the ultimate result is to bring a child into
the family. The third precept is that the physician should never encourage artificial
insemination, in fact he should discourage it because unless the couple has great
enthusiam, shared equally between the husband and wife, the experiment is doomed
to failure. Dr. Guttmacher's fourth rule eliminates the signing of records and other
papers. With the mutual confidence the couple and physician place in each other
the need for such records is removed. In addition records only work as a constant
reminder to the couple that their child was not conceived naturally. Fifth, the
physician supervising the insemination should also deliver the child. Since the patient
and physician have reached a position of mutual trust and confidence by this time,
the mother will be more relaxed and feel she is in friendly hands. Dr. Guttmacher,
in this respect, is perfectly willing to carry out the "white lie" of according paternity
to the legal father regardless of the biological parentage. The final maximum is to
keep medical fees as low as possible. If artificial insemination brings a high premium,
it would be all too human for physicians to administer to couples ill-suited for it.
Dr. Guttmacher acknowledges the extreme importance of the proper selection
of the donors. This should be done by the physician only. The author feels the best
qualified donors are physicians and medical students who themselves have fathered
normal children. The reasons are that this class of donors will freely discuss their
family trees allowing the physician to eliminate those who have a likelihood of trans-
mitting cacogenic factors, and one can be sure these donors are free of venereal dis-
ease since if they have any suspicion of such difficulty, they would rule themselves
out as donors.
In making his selection of a donor, Dr. Guttmacher, does not attempt to match
all the traits of the legal husband. He matches only the RH factor and the general
physical characteristics.
The final paragraph of the Doctor's article reiterates his position as follows:
"The procedure should be known to only three people: the doctor, the husband, and
the wife, so that to all intents and purposes the child is the biological as well as the
legal child of the couple. Unless we can achieve this attitude and result, it seems to
me that the procedure has little merit."
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outlaw the practice of A.I.D. because this would be an unreasonable
exercise of the police power. Yet we cannot effectively regulate the
activity because this too may violate the Constitution as an unreason-
able exercise of the police power. The dilemma is clear.
Thus, as the child created through A.I.D. is in search of a defined
status in the community, the courts themselves are engaged in the same
search. But whereas the child can hope that the "authority" of the
court will suffice to fix his status, the courts have yet to find the
appropriate authorities upon which to formulate an answer to the
problem they are asked to decide. Even should the courts be able to
decide particularized questions relative to legitimacy, it remains to be
seen whether courts can fashion ad hoc the breadth of regulation re-
quired to settle the problems in this area. Illustrative perhaps of the
strain put on the judiciary when the legislature in a pluralistic society
is unable to arrive at a common social denominator, the problem may
pose an interesting test to see whether the courts can reach a case
method solution to a problem more attuned to legislative resolution.
Albert P. Massey, Jr.
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APPENDIX
A PROPOSED ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION STATUTE
Statement of Purpose
The express purpose of this statute is to regulate the human activity known as
artificial insemination by the sperm of a third party donor (A.I.D.). This statute
is drawn to correct the problems and confusion now existing regarding the legal
status of children born by the use of this method of conception, the legal status and
responsibility of the donor of sperm, the marital status of the mother of such child and
the legal status and responsibility of her husband, whether or not consenting thereto.
This statute is drafted in view of the dangers to health that may exist if A.I.D.
remains unregulated and to establish a method of conduct for those persons in any way
participating in A.I.D.
Article I. Definitions
Sec. 1. The Donor: Any male, twenty-one years of age or over, being of sound
mind and body may be qualified as a donor of sperm for the purposes of artificial
insemination.
Sec. 2. The Husband: Under this act the husband is the lawful spouse of any
woman applying for artificial insemination.
Sec. 3. The Mother: The mother is the lawful spouse of the husband defined in
Section 2 and the applicant for artificial insemination.
Sec. 4. The Physician: The physician referred to in this act must be a licensed
medical practitioner. A person is acting as a physician within the meaning of this act
when such person is examining the parties, extracting or administering sperm for the
purposes of artificial insemination.
Sec. 5. The Child: The child under this act is the offspring produced through
artificial insemination.
Article II. The Donor
Sec. 1. Any male donating sperm for the purposes of artificial insemination must
do so willingly, without coercion or pressure from any source and in compliance with
all the sections of this Article.
Sec. 2. Any donor must file an application, as required under Article VIII of
this act, containing his name, address, age, race, color and marital status.
Sec. 3. To be eligible each donor must complete a physical examination by a
physician as defined under this act finding him free of syphilis and other venereal
desease as well as any physical or mental defect transmittable through the repro-
duction process. A copy of the results of such examination shall be made, dated and
signed by the examining physician and filed with the Board of Artificial Insemination
as required under Article VIII of this act.
Sec. 4. Each donor must complete, sign and file a form stating that he is giving
freely and of his own accord, that all sections of this article have been fully and
adequately performed, that the donor has no knowledge of any physical or mental
defect not discovered upon physical examination, and that the donor understands that
should conception and birth take place donor, and his wife, should he have one, has
no claim or relationship whatsoever to the child or its mother, now and forever.
The wife as a donor shall complete a form which shall contain a statement that she
is fully aware of the donation and gives her consent thereto willingly and knowingly,
that she is unaware of any physical or mental defect not discovered upon physical
examination which would render the donor ineligible for donation and that she and
donor shall have no claim or relationship to the child and its mother, now and
forever. This form must be signed by the donor, his wife, and one witness.
Sec. 5. A donor may become eligible only as provided in Article VIII, and may
not donate without the proof of eligibility.
Sec. 6. Any donor not complying with all the sections of this article shall be
deemed in violation of this act.
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Article III. The Husband
Sec. 1. Before the wife of any husband within the meaning of this act can
become qualified for artificial insemination said husband must submit for filing a
written, dated and signed consent conforming to the provisions set forth in Section 2
of this Article and Section 1 of Article IV.
Sec. 2. The written consent of the husband must contain statements evidencing
voluntary consent on his part, knowledge of the procedure involved and the method
of administration, assumption of all risks regarding the health and possible infirmities
of the child except as provided in Section 2 of Article VI, knowledge that any child
born as a result of artificial insemination conforming with this act shall be his
legitimate child and lawful heir with all rights, privileges and duties owing thereto
as are owing to any child by his natural father, and that artificial insemination under
this act is not a marital offense except as provided in Article IX, and all duties owing
to the mother are as if the child were the natural offspring of them both.
Article IV. The Mother
Sec. 1. A mother shall apply for artificial insemination by filing an applica-
tion stating her name, the name of her husband, her address, age and reasons for so
applying. Such application must be accompanied by the written consent of the husband
as required in Article III.
Sec. 2. To be qualified the mother must submit to a physical examination by a
physician as provided in this act finding her free of syphilis and other venereal desease
as well as any physical or mental defect transmittable through the reproduction
process. A copy of the results of such examination shall be carefully made, dated and
signed by the examining physician and filed with the Board of Artificial Insemination
as required under Article VIII of this act.
Sec. 3. The mother shall complete a form stating that she is submitting willingly
and of her own accord, that all Sections of Article III and IV have been fully per-
formed, that she and her husband have no knowledge of any physical or mental defects
not discovered upon her examination, that she and her husband have knowledge
and agree that any child produced shall be their legitimate child and lawful heir, now
and forever. This form shall be signed by the mother, her husband and one witness
prior to filing.
Sec. 4. From the date of filing of the statement described in Section 3 there
will be a waiting period of thirty (30) days before a proof of eligibility can be issued.
Such proof shall be then issued according to Article VIII.
Sec. 5. After issuance of proof as provided in Article VIII, the mother and
husband together shall select the sperm to be used in the insemination.
Sec. 6. Any mother failing to meet all the provisions of this article shall be in
violation of this act.
Article V. The Physician
Sec. 1. Any physician within the meaning of this act shall be held to the ordi-
nary standard of care required of medical practitioners engaged in this type of activity
and is not held to otherwise guarantee or warrant the quality of the sperm, success
of the insemination, or health of the child.
Sec. 2. No physician is qualified to extract or administer sperm, unless a proof
of eligibility can be exhibited by the relevant parties.
Sec. 3. Failure by a physician to comply with all the sections of this article and
all sections of this act dealing with physical examinations shall be a violation of
this act.
Article VI. The Child
Sec. 1. Any child born in conformity with this act shall be deemed the legiti-
mate child of the mother and husband and the lawful heir of both.
Sec. 2. Under this act a child shall be illegitimate only when the mother violates
those sections of this act pertaining to the consent of her husband and the selection
of the sperm.
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Article VII. Classification of Sperm
Sec. 1. Any institution whether publicly or privately owned or operated, hous-
ing, storing or distributing sperm for the purposes of artificial insemination shall mark
each container with the name, address, age and physical characteristics of the donor
including race, color and educational background.
Sec. 2. Each such institution shall guarantee and warrant that the sperm is as
healthy and of as high quality as when received by it and that it has exercised the
ordinary standard of care required in housing, storing, and distributing a product of
this nature.
Sec. 3. No institution shall receive or distribute sperm without the exhibition
of a proof of eligibility by the party donating or requesting sperm.
Sec. 4. Each institution shall keep and file complete records of all its transac-
tions and shall surrender them only upon issuance of a court order.
Sec. 5. Failure to conform to all the sections of this article is a violation of
this act.
Article VIII. Filing and Recording
Sec. 1. This article provides for the establishment of a Public Board of Artificial
Insemination to function under the auspices of the State Bureau of Health and Welfare
for the purposes of filing, recording and issuing proofs of eligibility in conformance
with all the sections of this article. Such Board shall consist of a physician, a
psychiatrist and a lawyer.
Sec. 2. All statements and records required to be filed as a requisite to eligi-
bility shall be filed only by the Board and copies thereof issued only through a
court order.
Sec. 3. The Board shall issue proof of eligibility only when all statements are in
order and on file.
Sec. 4. Each proof of eligibility shall contain the name, address and age of the
applicant and his (her) physical characteristics, including race and color, for the.
purpose of identification.
Sec. 5. Each proof shall be dated and shall be valid for a period of six (6) months.
Article IX. Sanctions
Sec. 1. Any donor violating this act through his own negligence shall be liable
for all the necessary and forseeable consequences to the mother and child resulting
therefrom.
Sec. 2. Any donor knowingly violating this act except as provided in Section 3
of this article shall be liable for all consequences to the mother and child resulting
therefrom, subject to $1,000 fine, up to one (1) year imprisonment or both.
Sec. 3. Any donor failing to acquire the consent of his wife as provided in
Article II shall be guilty of a marital offense sufficient to constitute grounds for a
civil divorce.
Sec. 4. Any mother failing to comply with the sections of this act dealing with
her physical examination shall be barred from recovering from any person(s) in
violation of this act except where such violation in no way contributed to the injury
to her or to her child.
Sec. 5. Any mother failing to comply with the sections of this act pertaining to
the consent of her husband and selection of the sperm shall render the child illegiti-
mate and be guilty of a marital offense sufficient to constitute grounds for a civil
divorce and subject her to a $1,000 fine, up to one (1) year imprisonment or both.
Sec. 6. Any husband aware of or aiding in the violation of any section of this
act, except those sections pertaining to procedural requirements and the consent of the
wife of the donor, shall be barred from recovering under this act and from enforcing
Section 5 of this Article and shall be deemed the lawful father of the child as if no
violation occurred.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol9/iss1/6
FALL 1963] COMMENTS 93
Sec. 7. Any physician failing to meet the standard of care required under Sec-
tion 1 of Article V shall be guilty of malpractice.
Sec. 8. Any physician extracting or administering sperm without requiring
proof of eligibility or while knowing of any violation of this act shall be liable for
all consequences to the mother and child resulting from such violation, subject to a$1,000 fine, up to one (1) year imprisonment or both.
Sec. 9. Any institution under Article VII violating its standard of care shall
be liable for the necessary and forseeable consequences to the mother and child result-
ing therefrom.
Sec. 10. Any institution knowingly violating any Section of this act or knowing
of any violation of this act shall be liable for all consequences to the mother and child
resulting therefrom and subject to fines up to $50,000.
Sec. 11. All persons within this act shall be liable jointly and severally.
17
Massey: Artificial Insemination: The Law's Illegitimate Child
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
